Fix URL sanitizer for long URLs (#16026)

f1aa699 was fundamentally incorrect as it used `IdnToAscii` and
`IdnToUnicode` on the entire URL, even though these functions only work
on domain names. This commit fixes the issue by using the WinRT `Url`
class and its `AbsoluteUri` and `AbsoluteCanonicalUri` getters.
The algorithm still works the same way though.

Closes #16017

## Validation Steps Performed
* ``"`e]8;;https://www.xn--fcbook-3nf5b.com/`e\test`e]8;;`e\"``
  still shows as two URLs in the popup 
* Shows the given URI if it's canonical and not an IDN 
* Works with >100 char long file:// URIs 
This commit is contained in:
Leonard Hecker
2023-09-28 08:46:26 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent cf193858f6
commit 198c11f36d
3 changed files with 48 additions and 48 deletions

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@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ UFIELD
ULARGE
UOI
UPDATEINIFILE
urlmon
userenv
USEROBJECTFLAGS
Vcpp
@@ -231,6 +232,7 @@ wcsstr
wcstoui
WDJ
winhttp
wininet
winmain
winsta
winstamin

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@@ -4,11 +4,9 @@
#include "pch.h"
#include "TermControl.h"
#include <unicode.hpp>
#include <LibraryResources.h>
#include "TermControlAutomationPeer.h"
#include "../../types/inc/GlyphWidth.hpp"
#include "../../renderer/atlas/AtlasEngine.h"
#include "TermControl.g.cpp"
@@ -3208,51 +3206,6 @@ namespace winrt::Microsoft::Terminal::Control::implementation
_core.ClearHoveredCell();
}
// Attackers abuse Unicode characters that happen to look similar to ASCII characters. Cyrillic for instance has
// its own glyphs for а, с, е, о, р, х, and у that look practically identical to their ASCII counterparts.
// This is called an "IDN homoglyph attack".
//
// But outright showing Punycode URIs only is similarly flawed as they can end up looking similar to valid ASCII URIs.
// xn--cnn.com for instance looks confusingly similar to cnn.com, but actually represents U+407E.
//
// An optimal solution would detect any URI that contains homoglyphs and show them in their Punycode form.
// Such a detector however is not quite trivial and requires constant maintenance, which this project's
// maintainers aren't currently well equipped to handle. As such we do the next best thing and show the
// Punycode encoding side-by-side with the Unicode string for any IDN.
static winrt::hstring sanitizeURI(winrt::hstring uri)
{
if (uri.empty())
{
return uri;
}
wchar_t punycodeBuffer[256];
wchar_t unicodeBuffer[256];
// These functions return int, but are documented to only return positive numbers.
// Better make sure though. It allows us to pass punycodeLength right into IdnToUnicode.
const auto punycodeLength = std::max(0, IdnToAscii(0, uri.data(), gsl::narrow<int>(uri.size()), &punycodeBuffer[0], 256));
const auto unicodeLength = std::max(0, IdnToUnicode(0, &punycodeBuffer[0], punycodeLength, &unicodeBuffer[0], 256));
if (punycodeLength <= 0 || unicodeLength <= 0)
{
return RS_(L"InvalidUri");
}
const std::wstring_view punycode{ &punycodeBuffer[0], gsl::narrow_cast<size_t>(punycodeLength) };
const std::wstring_view unicode{ &unicodeBuffer[0], gsl::narrow_cast<size_t>(unicodeLength) };
// IdnToAscii/IdnToUnicode return the input string as is if it's all
// plain ASCII. But we don't know if the input URI is Punycode or not.
// --> It's non-Punycode and ASCII if it round-trips.
if (uri == punycode && uri == unicode)
{
return uri;
}
return winrt::hstring{ fmt::format(FMT_COMPILE(L"{}\n({})"), punycode, unicode) };
}
void TermControl::_hoveredHyperlinkChanged(const IInspectable& /*sender*/, const IInspectable& /*args*/)
{
const auto lastHoveredCell = _core.HoveredCell();
@@ -3261,12 +3214,48 @@ namespace winrt::Microsoft::Terminal::Control::implementation
return;
}
const auto uriText = sanitizeURI(_core.HoveredUriText());
auto uriText = _core.HoveredUriText();
if (uriText.empty())
{
return;
}
// Attackers abuse Unicode characters that happen to look similar to ASCII characters. Cyrillic for instance has
// its own glyphs for а, с, е, о, р, х, and у that look practically identical to their ASCII counterparts.
// This is called an "IDN homoglyph attack".
//
// But outright showing Punycode URIs only is similarly flawed as they can end up looking similar to valid ASCII URIs.
// xn--cnn.com for instance looks confusingly similar to cnn.com, but actually represents U+407E.
//
// An optimal solution would detect any URI that contains homoglyphs and show them in their Punycode form.
// Such a detector however is not quite trivial and requires constant maintenance, which this project's
// maintainers aren't currently well equipped to handle. As such we do the next best thing and show the
// Punycode encoding side-by-side with the Unicode string for any IDN.
try
{
// DisplayUri/Iri drop authentication credentials, which is probably great, but AbsoluteCanonicalUri()
// is the only getter that returns a punycode encoding of the URL. AbsoluteUri() is the only possible
// counterpart, but as the name indicates, we'll end up hitting the != below for any non-canonical URL.
//
// This issue can be fixed by using the IUrl API from urlmon.h directly, which the WinRT API simply wraps.
// IUrl is a very complex system with a ton of useful functionality, but we don't rely on it (neither WinRT),
// so we could alternatively use its underlying API in wininet.h (InternetCrackUrlW, etc.).
// That API however is rather difficult to use for such seldom executed code.
const Windows::Foundation::Uri uri{ uriText };
const auto unicode = uri.AbsoluteUri();
const auto punycode = uri.AbsoluteCanonicalUri();
if (punycode != unicode)
{
const auto text = fmt::format(FMT_COMPILE(L"{}\n({})"), punycode, unicode);
uriText = winrt::hstring{ text };
}
}
catch (...)
{
uriText = RS_(L"InvalidUri");
}
const auto panel = SwapChainPanel();
const auto scale = panel.CompositionScaleX();
const auto offset = panel.ActualOffset();

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@@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ Revision History:
#pragma once
template<>
struct fmt::formatter<winrt::hstring, wchar_t> : fmt::formatter<fmt::wstring_view, wchar_t>
{
auto format(const winrt::hstring& str, auto& ctx)
{
return fmt::formatter<fmt::wstring_view, wchar_t>::format({ str.data(), str.size() }, ctx);
}
};
// This is a helper macro for both declaring the signature of an event, and
// defining the body. Winrt events need a method for adding a callback to the
// event and removing the callback. This macro will both declare the method