[PR #14513] [MERGED] GitHub Workflows security hardening #30128

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opened 2026-01-31 09:38:48 +00:00 by claunia · 0 comments
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📋 Pull Request Information

Original PR: https://github.com/microsoft/terminal/pull/14513
Author: @sashashura
Created: 12/8/2022
Status: Merged
Merged: 12/19/2022
Merged by: @carlos-zamora

Base: mainHead: patch-1


📝 Commits (1)

  • 201b4f7 build: harden addToProject.yml permissions

📊 Changes

1 file changed (+1 additions, -0 deletions)

View changed files

📝 .github/workflows/addToProject.yml (+1 -0)

📄 Description

This PR adds explicit permissions section to workflows. This is a
security best practice because by default workflows run with extended
set of permissions
(except from on: pull_request from external
forks
). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to
none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised
workflow can do (because of an injection or compromised third party
tool or action) is restricted.

It is recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level and
grant write permissions on job level case by case.


🔄 This issue represents a GitHub Pull Request. It cannot be merged through Gitea due to API limitations.

## 📋 Pull Request Information **Original PR:** https://github.com/microsoft/terminal/pull/14513 **Author:** [@sashashura](https://github.com/sashashura) **Created:** 12/8/2022 **Status:** ✅ Merged **Merged:** 12/19/2022 **Merged by:** [@carlos-zamora](https://github.com/carlos-zamora) **Base:** `main` ← **Head:** `patch-1` --- ### 📝 Commits (1) - [`201b4f7`](https://github.com/microsoft/terminal/commit/201b4f7a31dfa6de9428b3ecaf680a3816025425) build: harden addToProject.yml permissions ### 📊 Changes **1 file changed** (+1 additions, -0 deletions) <details> <summary>View changed files</summary> 📝 `.github/workflows/addToProject.yml` (+1 -0) </details> ### 📄 Description This PR adds explicit [permissions section] to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with [extended set of permissions] (except from `on: pull_request` [from external forks]). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an [injection] or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted. It is recommended to have [most strict permissions on the top level] and grant write permissions on [job level] case by case. [permissions section]: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions [extended set of permissions]: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication#permissions-for-the-github_token [from external forks]: https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ [injection]: https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/ [most strict permissions on the top level]: https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions [job level]: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs --- <sub>🔄 This issue represents a GitHub Pull Request. It cannot be merged through Gitea due to API limitations.</sub>
claunia added the pull-request label 2026-01-31 09:38:48 +00:00
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Reference: starred/terminal#30128